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Q U E S T I O N S FOR R E V I E W

1.

W h e r e the facts are called to its attention, may the Court

of A p p e a l s base an affirmance on a finding of the District Court
unsupported by any evidence in the record?
2.

Can the testimony of counsel for an optionee that he believ-

ed, w i t h o u t comrn 1 inica t i on w:i t h op t i oner s oi i !: 1:ie si Ib j ec t or any understanding of their i n t e n t i o n s , that the statement of consideration in
an option ("$5,000.00 and other good and v a l u a b l e consideration") w a s
"shorthand" £or something undisclosed, a 1 oi Ie create sueh ambiguity in
the option as to permit resort to p a r o l evidence to discover altern a t i v e consideration for the option:
a;

w h e r e there is no the evidence that the optioners

understood the phrase " $ 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 " to represent anything except
$5, b.

w h e r e enforcement of the option without requiring pay-

m e n t of the consideration stated in the option destroys the tax
e f f e c 1: s a ci rn i 1 1 e d ] v i r I 1: e n d e d f o i: 1:1 I e I: i: a n s a c t i o n s ?
3.

A r e copies of documents w r i t t e n by a central witness a d m i s s -

ible on the ground of impeachment of the w i t n e s s , w h e r e
a.

portions of the documents have been om:i 11eci in copying

them, the m i s s i n g p o r t i o n s cannot be supplied, and the documents
are unintelligible without them;
b.

a l l of the documents are fragmentary and partially

illegible;
c.

there is no evidence that the documents were composed

on the same o c c a s i o n ( s ) , or are otherwise related to one another;

cL

it is impossible to identify ti le persoi i(s) speaking in

the documents;
e.

counsel has staple! tr--- iocuments together in the

manner thought to be most suggestive, but without evidence that
they belong together in that manner;
f. • the meaning claimed to inhere in the documents is not
merely cumulative of other evidence about that witness, but is
purported to contain hearsay confessions of other parties; and
g.

the documents were not produced as required by a pre-

trial order?
4.

May interest * • * .

deoor- \ • *
- -\ *

-nf-ni-: specific enforce-

ment of an agreement to convey realty be awarded to a buyer who has
had use and possession of the realty throughout.?

COURT OF APPEALS OPINION

The decision of the Court of Appeals is found at 7 5 Utah Advance
Reports 59.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The decision of the Court of Appeal, \-i- entered February 10,
1988.

Rehearing was denied March 14, y .-».< .
Jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Couri

confirmed by

§78-2-2 and §78-2a-4,

*:

+

o review the decision is

•-i- M . (1953).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an action for specific performance of an option to buy
land.

The District Court decreed specific enforcement and the Court

of Appeals affirmed.

The essential facts are as follows:

In the Fall of 1981, William Colman approached defendants Archer
and Wolfe seeking a loan of $750,000.00 to be used in a project
extracting minerals from brine in Nevada.

Archer and Wolfe refused.

Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 417; Vol. IV, pp. 535-537; Vol. V, pp. 731-732.
Subsequently, Colman offered to sell Archer and Wolfe a limited partnership interest in the brine project for $250,000.00, and a ranch in
Cache County, Utah, for a further $250,000.00.
agreed.

Archer and Wolfe

Tr. Vol. I, p. 10 et seq.; Vol. Ill, p. 419 et seq.; Vol. IV,

p. 537; Vol. V, pg. 731 et seq.; Vol. Ill, pp. 423-428; Vol. IV, pp.
239 et seq., 539; Vol V. pp. 734-740.

Colman then asked for a one

year option to re-purchase the ranch.

Archer and Wolfe agreed.

Tr.

Vol. I, pp. 739, 746; Vol. Ill, p. 430 et seq.; Vol. IV, p. 541; Vol.
V, pp. 764-765.

Subsequently, the one year option was extended to a

one and one-half year option.

Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 449 et seq.; Vol. IV,

pp. 563-564; Vol. V, p. 760 et seq.

The consideration stated for the

option was "$5,000.00 and other good and valuable consideration".
option was purposefully given a date ("March

The

, 1982") several

months after the deed to the ranch was delivered, though both documents were signed at once.

Tr. Vol. V, pp. 764-765.

Colman had his attorney, Frank Allen, prepare the documents.
Allen testified that he took no part in the negotiation of the terms
of any of the documents (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 43, 93-95), and could be sure
only that he received instructions on their preparation from Colman.

Tr. Vol. I, pp. 44-45, 49, 63.

In particular, he never communicated

with the parties about the $5,000.00 consideration expressed for the
option.

Tr. Vol. II, pp. 154-155.

Moreover, he made no attempt to

understand, and did not understand the purposes of the defendants in
structuring the transactions as they did (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 94-95),
though he understood that some tax benefits were thought to accrue
from that structure.
Allen prepared, and the parties executed, a certificate of limited partnership requiring certain expenditures and certain royalties in
exchange for $250,000.00, an agreement for purchase of real property
and a deed transferring the ranch for $250,000.00, and the option.
When the option became operable in March, 1982, Archer and Wolfe
sought the $5,000.00 consideration.

Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 467-474; Vol.

IV, pp. 574-589; Vol. V, pp. 768-770.

Colman did not pay it.

Id.

The demand was repeated a number of times thereafter, but the
$5,000.00 was never paid.

Id.

Finally, Archer and Wolfe advised

Colman that if the $5,000.00 was not paid, the option would be regarded as invalid.

Tr. Vol. IV, p. 589.

Colman testified that when the documents were executed, he believed that the $5,000.00 for the option had to be paid.
pp. 570-572, 587.

Later, when the $5,000.00 was demanded and he

didn't have it, he asked Frank Allen if it had to be paid.
IV, p. 578.

Tr. Vol. IV,

Tr. Vol.

Allen testified that in response to that inquiry he told

Colman that he, Allen, had inserted the $5,000.00 in the option as a
quantification of benefits, particularly over-riding royalties expressed in the limited partnership agreement, to be received by Archer
and Wolfe, and that the $5,000.00 didn't have to be paid.
VI, pp. 1006-1007.

Tr. Vol.

Upon cross-exmamination, however, Allen conceded that he had
never discussed his idea about the $5,000.00 with any of the parties
at the time of execution of the documents, nor had they discussed
their ideas about it with him; that, in fact, he had no way of knowing
what they thought about it, and that they might have decided on the
$5,000.00 for some purpose wholly unknown to him.
154-155; Vol. VI, pp. 1012-1013.

Tr. Vol. II, pp.

Archer, Wolfe and Colman testified

that the $5,000.00 was negotiated and agreed upon as the price for
extending the option from 1 year to lh years.

Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 564-

567; Vol. Ill, pp. 450-454; Vol. V, pp. 760-762.
Subsequently, Colman assigned the option to plaintiff Miller.
Archer and Wolfe immediately upon being notified of the assignment,
notified Miller that the $5,000.00 had never been paid, and that
unless it was paid the option would be considered invalid.

Tr. Vol.

II, pp. 311-312, 322.
Miller did not pay the $5,000.00.

Instead, he approached Allen

and Colman for affidavits that the $5,000.00 did not need to be paid.
Allen prepared such affidavits, and they were signed by Allen and
Colman, though Colman testified that he signed the document at Allen's
instruction without reading it.

Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 598-599.

Several months thereafter, Archer and Wolfe advised Miller that
the option was withdrawn because the $5,000.00 had not been paid.
Vol. II, p. 322.

Tr.

Miller thereafter sought to exercise the option, and

suit followed.
At trial, the District Court over objection admitted parol evidence on the issue of whether the $5,000.00 was due.

By way of

impeachment of Colman, plaintiff offered, and the District Court
admitted, a series of copies of irregularly shaped pieces of paper

bearing Colman's handwriting (Exhibits 54, 55, 56). The documents had
been poorly copied, were incomplete and illegible, and had been reconstructed by counsel in the form he thought most suggestive.

Colman

could not identify the documents except as possible notes of a conversation with plaintifffs counsel.

Tr. Vol. VI, pp. 945 et seq.

The

condition of the documents could not be explained by counsel, nor
could he assure the court that they were in the same condition as when
received from Colman.

Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 1107-1120, 1144-1161.

Defend-

ants objected to the documents as hearsay, and to their admission as
in violation of Ev. Rule 106.

Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 693-695; Vol. VI, pp.

1113-1117
Ultimately, the District Court determined that the $5,000.00 was
not required to be paid, on the basis that Frank Allen's testimony was
more credible than William Colman's.

Finding of Fact No. 32, 33.

The

District Court found that "the real consideration for the Option
consisted of the 'other good and valuable consideration', which included the conveyance of the Anderson Ranch by Special Warranty Deed
from Royalty to the Defendants, the $650,000.00 to be paid for the
Anderson Ranch upon exercise of the Option, the Limited Partnership
benefits as to profit sharing and the overriding royalty, and the
various tax benefits occurring to the Defendants by structuring the
total transaction their way".

Finding of Fact No. 21.

The Court of Appeals also resolved the matter by resolving the
conflict in the testimony of Allen and Colman in favor of Allen, and
observed that "the trial court looked at the substance of the parties1
entire dealings and found that the structuring of the total commitments was the intended consideration for the Option.
this was error."

Opinion, p. 5.

We cannot say

ARGUMENT

Questions 1 and 2:
An option not supported by separate consideration is an offer
which may be withdrawn at any time.

Catmull v. Johnson, 541 P.2d 793

(Utah 1975); Fitzgerald v^ Boyle, 193 Pac. 1109 (Utah 1920). If the
option in this case was not supported by some agreed upon consideration, other than the $5,000.00 expressed in it which was not paid, it
was properly withdrawn and could not be enforced.
With respect to an alternative consideration for the option, the
Court of Appeals concluded as follows:
"This is substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that the recital of '$5,000.00 and other good and valuable
consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged1 in the
Option was nominal consideration inserted by the drafter of the agreement for convenience as the parties did not wish to reveal in writing
the true consideration for the deal...

Allen testified that he had

consistently informed the parties that he had inserted the $5,000.00
amount on his own, intending it as a legal shorthand for the true
consideration, and it was not an item for which the parties bargained...

The trial court looked at the substance of the parties1

entire dealings and found that the structuring of the total commitments was the intended consideration for the Option.
this was error."

We cannot say

Opinion, pp. 4-5.

These holdings require review because:
1.

Despite appellants1 protests, the Court of Appeals declined

to review the transcript to observe that the alleged testimony of
Frank Allen relied upon to constitute "substantial evidence" in sup-

port of the District Court's ruling, that Allen advised defendants
that "$5,000.00" was inserted in the Option as shorthand for something
else, and that he had knowledge of negotiations of the parties respecting consideration for the option, was never given.

That is, the

testimony relied upon by the Court of Appeals as the "substantial
evidence" in support of the ruling does not exist, and the decision
violates the basic requirement that judgments be supported by findings, and findings by substantial evidence.
2.

Lacking such testimony, there was no evidentiary basis for

imputing to defendants Frank Allen's idea that "$5,000.00 and other
good and valuable consideration" was shorthand for something else, and
there was no ambiguity in the Option to be explained.

The admission

of evidence of alternative considerations for the option was not by
way of explaining an ambiguity, but merely varied the terms of the
document.
The actual finding of the District in this regard was that
"The real consideration for the Option consisted of the
'other good and valuable consideration', which included the
conveyance of the Anderson Ranch by Special Warranty Deed
from Royalty to the Defendants, the $650,000.00 to be paid
for the Anderson Ranch upon exercise of the Option, the
Limited Partnership benefits as to profit sharing and the
overriding royalty, and the various tax benefits accruing
to the Defendants by structuring the total transaction
their way." District Court Finding of Fact No. 21.
Rather than finding that "the structuring of the total commitments was
the intended consideration for the Option", the District Court simply
plucked the contractual considerations out of other integrated agreements, the limited partnership agreement and the real estate contract,
and inserted them in the Option.

This process not only altered the

terms of the option, but of the other agreements, in violation of the
parol evidence rule, and precedents of the Utah Supreme Court inter-

preting it.
3.

The holding that there was "substantial evidence" of alter-

native consideration for the option converted the sale and option of
the realty into "the functional equivalent of a loan" (District Court
Finding of Fact No. 31), erasing the tax benefits for which the sale
and option structure admittedly was chosen.

Precedents of the Supreme

Court forbid the admission of parol which alters the bargained-for
effect of the documents, and require clear and convincing evidence
that both parties regarded deeds absolute on their face as security
instruments.

Paloni v. Beebe, 110 P.2d 563 (Utah 1941); Wood v.

Roberts, 586 P.2d 405 (Utah 1978); Corey v. Roberts, 25 P.2d 940, 942,
947 (Utah 1933); Thomas v. Ogden State Bank, 13 P.2d 436 (Utah 1932);
Kjar v. Brimley, 27 Utah 2d 411, 497 P.2d 23 (Utah 1972).
The Court of Appeals concluded that if it were shown that the
phrase "$5,000.00 and other good and valuable consideration" were a
statement of "nominal consideration" mere shorthand for something
else, not a requirement that $5,000.00 be paid, and if it could be
shown further that the three agreements executed by the parties - the
limited partnership agreement, the real estate sales contract, and the
option - were in fact one contract, the considerations stated in the
limited partnership agreement and real estate sales contract could
provide consideration for the option.
"$5,000.00", however, is neither nominal nor ambiguous, and a
claim that there was, in addition, some "other good and valuable
consideration" would not excuse the failure to pay the $5,000.00.
Luther v. Nat 1 1 Bank of Commerce, 98 P.2d 667 (Wash. 1940); U.S. v.
Schaefer, 319 F.2d 907 (9 Cir. 1963).

The possibility of ambiguity in

this case was created only by the acknowledgment of receipt of

$5,000.00 where no money was delivered.

That is, the acknowledgment

might not be regarded as a simple misstatement of fact; it could be
regarded as raising a question whether the phrase "$5,000.00" might
represent something of that value not money.

To show the latter,

however, required evidence that defendants, at the time of making the
agreements, entertained the notion that "$5,000.00" could stand for
something else.

The evidence on this point that the Court of Appeals

thought existed in this record does not exist.

The question, there-

fore, what alternative consideration for the option might have been
should never have been reached. —

That is, to show that there was a

latent ambiguity in the option, it was necessary to show that the
parties, including defendants, regarded the otherwise unambiguous
phrase "$5,000.00" as representing something else.

There was no such

evidence, and therefore no ambiguity justifying a parol search for
alternative considerations.

—
Frank Allen's testimony was that he was not privy to the
negotiations for the agreements (Trial Transcript, Vol. I, pp. 43, 9395), that he could only be sure that he received instructions on
preparation of the documents from Colman (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 44-45, 49,
63), that he had no contemporaneous communication with the parties on
the subject of the consideration for the option (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 154155), that the parties might have agreed on payment of the $5,000.00
for the option without his knowing it (Tr. Vol. II, p. 158), and that
when the question of payment of the $5,000.00 arose after execution of
the documents he told Colman his view that it did not have to be paid
(Tr. Vol. VI, pp. 1006-1008). Allen never testified that he expressed
such a view to Archer or Wolfe, or they to him. What Allen, not a
party to the agreements, concluded separate and apart from Archer and
Wolfe and without knowing what they thought on the subject, was irrelevant, and should not have been admitted.
Colman's testimony, consistent with Archer and Wolfe's, was that
he negotiated with them and agreed to pay the $5,000.00 for the option
outside Allen1s presence. Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 556, 564-569. Colman also
signed an affidavit, on Allen's advice, stating that the $5,000.00 was
"window dressing" not intended to be paid. The finding, therefore,
that Allen's testimony was more credible than Colman's indicates
nothing about the intentions of Archer and Wolfe.

The effect of eliminating a separate consideration for the option, according to the District Court, was to render the sale-option
transaction "the functional equivalent 'of a loan", and the deed given,
in effect, a mortgage.

It is undisputed that defendants refused to

make a loan or take a mortgage because that would result in tax
treatment of proceeds of the reconveyance as ordinary income, and
insisted on a real option because that would result in capital gains
treatment of the proceeds.

The effect of the decision that the tax

advantages were the consideration for the option is to eliminate the
tax advantages.

The use of parol to alter the bargained-for effect of

documents is forbidden.

Paloni v. Beebe, supra; Wood v. Roberts,

supra; Rice, Melby Enterprises, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 646 P.2d 696
(Utah 1982) .
In practical effect, the Court of Appeals has held that parol
testimony regarding the intentions of one side of a transaction is
sufficient to sustain specific enforcement of an agreement without
payment of the stated consideration due from that side.

The evidence

here is that an attorney, not a party, without being privy to any
negotiations and without communication with the parties on the subject
of consideration, concluded that the $5,000.00 recited need not be
paid, and that his client testified contrarily about whether he
thought the $5,000.00 had to be paid.

The Utah Supreme Court has

never permitted parol reconstruction of two party agreements based
upon evidence of the intent of one party, and has held specifically
that parol evidence that deeds absolute on their face were intended as
mortgages must prove the intent of both parties, and must be clear and
convincing.

Corey v. Roberts, supra; Thomas v. Ogden State Bank,

supra; Kjar v. Brimley, supra.

Question 3
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the decision of the District Court was based upon a finding that the testimony of Frank Allen
"was more credible and consistent than Colman's".

Opinion, p. 5.

It

also acknowledged that certain "notes" in Colman's writing, admitted
for purposes of showing that Colman's testimony was not as credible
and consistent as Allen's, "were not totally legible, partially cut
off by the copier, and stapled together by Miller's attorneys".
Opinion, p. 6.

The documents (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 54, 55, 56) are

also discontinuous, unnumbered as to sequence, and without internal
indications of their original form or order:

all matters the Court of

Appeals could have observed by looking at the documents.

In fact, the

documents defy comprehension, and no explanation was provided for
their condition except Miller's counsel's handling of them outside the
regular processes of discovery.

Copies of the documents as admitted

in the District Court are appended hereto as Appendix B.
The Court of Appeals refused to exercise any judgment of its own
about the probative value of the documents, and refused to apply to
the "notes" the standard of Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 106 that
documents so incomplete that their meaning cannot be fairly determined
should not be admitted.
3rd Ed. (1984).

See McCormick, McCormick on Evidence, §56,

This appears to be the first reported decision of a

Utah appellate court interpreting Ev. Rule 106.
The Court of Appeals repeated the District Court's incorrect
conclusion that the "notes" were "duplicative of other competent
evidence that impeached Colman's trial testimony".

In fact, counsel's

claim for the notes was that they transcribed admissions of Archer and
Wolfe supportive of Miller's claims; that is, the documents were also

used to impeach Archer and Wolfe by inuendo.

See Tr. Vol. VI, p.

1114.
The decision of the Court of Appeals approving admission of the
"notes" requires review because it establishes an improper interpretation of Evidence Rule 106, and because the improper admission of the
documents directly affected what the District Court and Court of
Appeals regarded as a central issue in the determination, the credibility of Colman.
The Court of Appeals1 observation, based upon a case which predates adoption of Evidence Rule 106 in Utah (Opinion, p. 6 ) , that
writings of a witness may be introduced for purposes of impeachment,
simply begs the question whether any document may be admitted, for any
purpose, if it is in such incomplete form that its meaning cannot be
fairly determined.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals has an obligation, where the
documents are placed before it, to observe for itself whether the
import of the documents can be fairly determined.

Here the Court of

Appeals ends analysis with the remark that "The trial court found
that, although the notes were not totally legible, partially cut off
by the copier, and stapled together by Miller f s attorneys, they did
provide a certain narrative flow and consistency that gave them substantial credibility."

Question 4
On the basis of cases from Florida and California which hold that
where a purchaser of property deposits funds for the purchase, but
subsequently withdraws them because the seller wrongfully refuses to
complete the transaction, the purchaser is entitled to interest accru-

ing on his money while in deposit, the Court of Appeals holds that
plaintiff was entitled to interest on the money deposited to obtain
specific performance in this case (Opinion, pp. 6-7), though it was
admitted that plaintiff had and exercised during the pendency of the
proceedings all of the use and possession of the property for which he
claimed he purchased it.

Tr. Vol. II, pp. 223-224, 275-280, 287-291,

295, 297). The corresponding testimony about defendants was that
during the same period they did not occupy the property, could not
dispose of it because of plaintiff's lis pendens, and made no use of
its except for one season in one year, with plaintiff's consent,
leasing the fraction of it suitable for the purpose to a cattle rancher.

Tr. Vol. IV, p. 54; Vol. V, pp. 781-782.
This decision requires review because it is directly contrary to

the Supreme Court's decision in Eliason v. Watts, 615 P.2d 427 (Utah
1980).

The law of Utah is that where specific performance is decreed

the parties are to be given the benefits of their bargain as of the
date it was to be executed.

The buyer should have the benefit of

possession of the land, and the seller should have the benefit of
possession of the money, from the date of execution.

The Court is

required in such case to apportion between buyer and seller the value
of the money deposited, and the value of the use of the land, from and
after the date money and the land should have been exchanged, based
upon who actually had use of the money and/or land.
615 P.2d 427, 430-431 (Utah 1980).

Eliason v. Watts,

If, because of a deposit, buyer

has not had use of his money, and the seller has meanwhile denied
buyer use of the land, the buyer is entitled to the interest accumulated on the money (and perhaps also to additional rental value of the
land).

On the other hand, if the seller has not had use of the money,

and has provided buyer use of the land, the seller is entitled to the
interest on the deposited funds*

If buyer and seller have shared use

of the land, some appropriate apportionment of the interest is required.

Anything else denies the parties the benefit of their

bargain.
The Court of Appeals should have awarded interest on the deposited funds to defendants, with a reduction for the rent received for
cattle running.

Dated this 13th day of April, 1988.
(

s-—;
/

> - >

E. Craig Smay
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John D. Archer and Elizabeth B. Archer,
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the Elizabeth Daly Archer Trust, and
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John D. Archer and Elizabeth B. Archer,
*>
l\
both individually and as Trustees for
v
^
the Elizabeth Daly Archer Trust, and
Hubert Wolfe, Judy W. Wolfe, and Elliott
V
Wolfe, as Trustees for Elliott Wolfe
Trust No. 701,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
v.
William J. Colman,
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
Ernest J. Miller,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
John D. Archer and Elizabeth
B. Archer, both individually
and as Trustees for the
Elizabeth Daly Archer Trust,
and Hubert Wolfe, Judy W.
Wolfe, and Elliott Wolfe, as
Trustees for Elliott Wolfe
Trust No. 701,
Defendants and Appellants

John D. Archer and Elizabeth
B. Archer, both individually
and as Trustees for the
Elizabeth Daly Archer Trust,
and Hubert Wolfe, Judy W.
Wolfe, and Elliott Wolfe, as
Trustees for Elliott Wolfe
Trust No. 701,

OPINION
(For Publication)
Case No. 860371-CA

IL C U
FEB 10 1983

Third-Party Plaintiffs,
Timothy r.. bneu
Clerk of the Court
Utah Coun of A^**a!s

v.
William J. Colman,
Third-Party Defendant.
Before Judges Billings, Davidson, and Garff.

BILLINGS, Judge:
Appellants John D. Archer and Elizabeth B. Archer, both

individually and as Trustees for the Elizabeth Daly Archer
Trust, and Hubert Wolfe, Judy W. Wolfe, and Elliott Wolfe, as
Trustees for Elliott Wolfe Trust No.'701 (MArcherM and/or
"Wolfe"), appeal from the trial court's judgment ordering
specific performance of an option to buy land in favor of
Respondent Ernest J. Miller ("Miller-), and from the award of
accrued interest to Miller. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Miller's action for specific performance against Archer
and Wolfe arises out of an earlier business relationship
between Archer, Wolfe, and William J. Colman, the third-party
defendant ("Colman"). Because it is integral to our decision,
we set out in detail the factual background of this complex
transaction. On appeal, we view the facts in the light most
favorable to the trial court's findings. See Security State
Bank v. Broadhead, 734 P.2d 469, 470-71 (Utah 198J).
In the late summer or early fall of 1981, Colman
approached Archer and Wolfe for a loan of $750,000. Colman
urgently needed the money to continue development of a business
venture. Archer advised Colman that he and Wolfe were not
interested in a simple loan due to the adverse tax consequences
resulting from interest income, nor would they invest the
$750,000 amount requested. Colraan then offered Archer and
Wolfe a limited partnership interest in a salt project known as
"Carson Sink" in Nevada ("limited partnership"), and an
interest in "Anderson Ranch" which Colman owned.
After consulting with their accountants about the tax
consequences, Archer and Wolfe told Colman they would advance a
total of $500,000, on the condition that the deal was
structured as follows: (1) a $250,000 investment in the
limited partnership, providing research and development tax
write-offs, an interest in profits during the life of the
partnership, and an overriding royalty thereafter, and (2) cash
payment of $250,000 as the purchase price of the Anderson
Ranch, coupled with a one-year option under which Colman could
repurchase the ranch for $600,000, allowing Archer and Wolfe to
treat the dollar return as capital gain.
Frank J. Allen ("Allen"), Colman1s attorney, drafted the
documents according to this plan. Allen structured the deal as
three separate transactions in order to achieve the tax
advantages Archer and Wolfe sought: (1) a limited partnership
interest; (2) the purchase of Anderson Ranch; and (3) a
one-year option to repurchase Anderson Ranch.
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Before the documents were executed, Archer and Wolfe
agreed to give Colman a one and one-half (1-1/2) year option,
instead of the original one-year option, for an increased total
purchase price of $650,000, and the documents reflect this
change.
The Option states that it was given to Colman "in
consideration of the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5000.00)
and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which
is hereby acknowledged.H Allen testified that the recital of
"$5000.00 and other good and valuable consideration the receipt
of which is hereby acknowledged1* was inserted by him merely as
a legal shorthand for the true consideration. He claimed the
$5000 was never intended to be the actual consideration for the
Option and that is why the recital indicated that $5000 had
been paid. Allen claimed that the real consideration for the
Option was the execution of the limited partnership agreement,
the Anderson Ranch agreement, and the various tax benefits
accruing to Archer and Wolfe by the structuring of the deal.
Colman did not pay $5000 to Archer and Wolfe for the
Option. Archer and Wolfe made various verbal inquiries
regarding payment, to which Colman responded he did not believe
he had to pay the $5000 based on the advice of Allen.
On November 2, 1982, Colman executed a Real Estate
Contract which assigned his rights under the Option to Miller
as Colman could not secure the $650,000 necessary to exercise
the Option. Subsequently, Archer and Wolfe received written
notice of this assignment and contacted Miller to inform him
that the $5000 for the Option had never been paid by Colman.
In addition, despite the lack of payment, Archer stated that he
and Wolfe were still willing to sell the Anderson Ranch to
Miller for a purchase price of $655,000. Negotiations for this
sale occurred, but it was never consummated.
On April 8, 1983, Archer and Wolfe attempted to revoke
the Option. Subsequently, Miller, Colman and Allen met and
discussed the status of the Option and all agreed that the
$5000 was never intended to be paid, but merely functioned as
window-dressing. The true consideration consisted of the
structuring of the transaction. Allen and Colman executed
affidavits to this effect following this meeting.
On May 16, 1983, Miller filed this action against Archer
and Wolfe and a lis pendens against the Anderson Ranch. Archer
and Wolfe later filed a third-party complaint against Colman.
On July 1, 1S83, Miller tendered to Archer and Wolfe his
cashier's check for $650,000 as an exercise of the Option
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to purchase the Anderson Ranch. The check was deposited in an
interest-bearing account, with entitlement to such interest to
be determined by the court. Since Miller's July 1, 1983
tender, Archer and Wolfe have held possession and all rights of
ownership to the Anderson Ranch.
CONSIDERATION FOR OPTION
The primary issue on appeal is whether the trial court
correctly ruled that the attempted revocation of the Option was
ineffective. The trial court found there was adequate
consideration to support the Option and therefore Miller was
entitled to specific performance. Over Archer's and Wolfe's
objections, the trial court admitted parol evidence to
ascertain the intended consideration for the Option. On
appeal, Archer and Wolfe contend the consideration can be
gleaned from the plain language of the Option and. therefore,
the trial court erred in admitting such evidence.* We
disagree.
Even if a written agreement appears to be completely
integrated, parol evidence is admissible to establish whether
there was consideration for a promise. Soukop v. Snvder, 709
P.2d 109, 113 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1985) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 218(2)(1981)). A recital of
consideration received is usually intended merely as written
acknowledgment of the distinct act of payment. It is inserted
for convenience, usually because the parties do not want to
reveal the real consideration. Paloni v. Beebe, 100 Utah 115,
118, 110 P.2d 563, 565 (1941) (quoting 9 Wigmore, Evidence
§ 2433 (3rd ed. 1981). Therefore, the parol evidence rule does
not prevent a party from showing the actual consideration when
a nominal consideration is recited. Wood v. Roberts, 586 P.2d
405, 407 (Utah 1978).
There is substantial evidence to support the trial
court's conclusion that the recital of "$5000.00 and other good
and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged" in the Option was nominal consideration inserted
1. The contentions of Archer and Wolfe are inconsistent. They
argue the consideration can be gleaned from the plain language
of the Option. However, while making this argument, they seem
to ignore the plain language of the Option which states that
the receipt of the consideration is hereby acknowledged. We
will not vievs the language of the Option out of context as
urged by Archer and Wolfe.
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by the drafter of the agreement for convenience as the parties
did not wish to reveal in writing the true consideration for
the deal.
At trial, there was conflicting testimony on the
necessity of paying the $5000 to Archer and Wolfe* Colman
claimed he knew that the $5000 was required to be paid before
he could exercise the Option. However, Colman's testimony was
contradicted by his own admissions on cross-examination, his
deposition prior to trial, his affidavit of May 2, 1983, and
his contemporaneous handwritten notes. Allen testified that he
had consistently informed the parties that he had inserted the
$5000 amount on his own, intending it as a legal shorthand for
the true consideration, and it was not an item for which the
parties bargained.
The trial court found Allen's testimony more credible and
consistent than Colman's, finding that the $5000 was never
intended to be paid. "[D]ue regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of
witnesses." Adams v. Gubler, 731 P.2d 494, 496 n.3 (Utah 1986)
(quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)). There is substantial evidence
to support the determination of the trial court, and, thus,
that finding must be sustained. Sather v. Pitcher, 73 Utah
Adv. Rep. 85, 86 (Ct. App. 1987).
The trial court found the true consideration for the
Option was embodied in the phrase "other good and valuable
consideration." Because of its ambiguity, the trial court
considered parol evidence to disclose its true meaning.
M
[W]hen a contract is ambiguous, because of the uncertain
meaning of terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies,
parol evidence is admissible to explain the parties' intent."
Faulkner v. Farnsworth. 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983);
Colonial Leasing Co, v. Larsen Bros. Const,. 731 P.2d 483, 487
(Utah 1986) . In such a determination, we defer to the finder
of fact. Craig Food Indus., Inc. v. Weihina, 746 P.2d 279, 283
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d at 1293;
Winegar v. Smith Inv. Co,. 590 P.2d 348, 350 (Utah 1979).
The trial court considered the testimony of the parties
and found that this phrase referred to the execution of the
various documents conveying the Anderson Ranch and limited
partnership interests, and the general tax structuring of the
total transaction. The trial court looked at the substance of
the parties' entire dealings and found that the structuring of
the total commitments was the intended consideration for the
Option. We cannot say this was error. Sather v. Pitcher, 73
Utah Adv. Rep. at 86.
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Archer and Wolfe also contend that the one and one-half
(1-1/2) year option was a new agreement executed after the
original one-year option, and therefore required new
consideration. We disagree. The facts support the trial
court's finding that the original one-year option was never
finalized. The original consideration supported the one and
one-half (1-1/2) year option.
The trial court's finding that there was sufficient
consideration to support the Option does not invalidate any of
the other agreements, as Archer and Wolfe claim. The Option,
limited partnership agreement, purchase contract and special
warranty deed are in no way impaired and are still valid and
enforceable agreements within the context of the larger
transaction, as the parties intended. The trial court merely
found the execution of these other agreements was the intended
consideration for the Option.
COLMAN'S HANDWRITTEN NOTES
Archer and Wolfe claim the trial court committed
reversible error in admitting copies of Colman's handwritten
notes, made during the course of the negotiations between him
and Archer and Wolfe. The notes conflicted with Colman's trial
testimony. The trial court found that, although the notes were
not totally legible, partially cut off by the copier, and
stapled together by Miller's attorneys, they did provide a
certain narrative flow and consistency that gave them
substantial credibility. These notes were properly admitted
for impeachment purposes. Schocker v. Milton 0. Bitner Co,, 30
Utah 2d 173, 176, 514 P.2d 1290, 1292 (1973); Utah R. Evid.
801(d)(1)(A). Furthermore, the admission of the notes was
duplicative of other competent evidence that impeached Colman's
trial testimony, including Colman's prior deposition and
affidavit.
INTEREST
Archer and Wolfe also challenge the award of accrued
interest to Miller. The trial court concluded that Miller was
entitled to the accruing interest on the $650,000 deposited
with the clerk of the court after Archer and Wolfe refused the
tender by Miller and retained possession of Anderson Ranch,
Common law and equity require that if a party obligated
to sell land retains possession, forcing the buyer to place
funds on deposit with the court pending settlement of the
action, then the seller is not entitled to the accrued interest
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on the deposited funds. Rasmussen v. Moe, 292 P.2d 226/ 230
(Cal. 1956); Resnick v. Goldman, 133 So.2d 770, 771-772 (Fla.
1961). The trial court's finding that Archer and Wolfe had
enjoyed possession and all rights of ownership of the Anderson
Ranch since Miller's July 1, 1983 tender of the $650,000
necessary to exercise the Option was supported by substantial
evidence. Archer and Wolfe retained all rents and profits paid
for grazing use of the land by third parties. In contrast,
Miller received no commercial benefit from the Anderson Ranch.
What limited and sporadic recreational use Miller has had of
the ranch has been without objection by Archer and Wolfe, and
similar to that traditionally enjoyed by many others in the
area.
Affirmed.

Costs to Miller,
&S

Judith M. Billings, Judge

WE CONCUR:

RicJlarcT'cTT JDavidson, Judge

RegnaT^W. Garff,
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Feb. 10, 1988. OPINION
This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted, and the
Court being Sufficiently advised in the premises, it is now
ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the trial
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Opinion of the Court by JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Judge; RICHARD C.
DAVIDSON, ana REGNAL W. GARFF, Judges, concur.
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THIS MATTER having come on for trial before the
above-entitled Court, the Honorable Omer J. Call, District Judge,
presiding and sitting without a jury, qn September 18, 19, 20, 27,
October 3, November 14, and December 17, 1985; and Plaintiff
having been represented by its counsel of record, L, Brent Hoggan,
of Olson & Hoggan, the Defendants having been represented by their
counsel of record, E. Craig Smay, and the Third-Party Defendant
having been represented by himself; and the Court having heard
testimony from witnesses for all the parties hereto during the
trial hereof and having received certain exhibits offered by the
parties as evidence in the matter; and the Court having received
trial briefs from counsel for both Plaintiff a*ri8 the Defendants on
the primary issues before the Court, and having reviewed the
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment prepared by Plaintiff and the
Defendants1 Objections thereto, and the Court having heretofore
made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure No. 15, and on

Plaintiff's motion at trial, the Plaintiff's Complaint is deemed
amended to conform to the evidence and Plaintiff's arguments at
trial, specifically including but not limited to quieting title to
the Anderson Ranch with regard to Colman's (and Archer and
Wolfe's) attempted exercise of the 4,b. option one (1)-year after
this litigation commenced, Plaintiff's claim to the accruing
interest on the tender money, and Plaintiff's request that the
Option, Real Estate Contract, Waiver and Release and the Complaint
herein be reformed to reflect the correct legal description of the
Anderson Ranch.
2.

The Court declares that the recorded Option, Real Estate

Contract and Waiver and Release are valid agreements, binding on
N & HOGGAN
RNEYS AT LAW
VEST CENTER

N UTAH 84 ,21
11)752-1551

all parties thereto, and fully enforceable by Plaintiff as the

-3proper assignee of Colman's Option on the Anderson Ranch and
all appurtenant water rights.
3.

Plaintiff is the owner and holder of the Option, the

Option is declared irrevocable, and by virtue of Plaintiff!s
proper exercise of the Option and Plaintiff's tender on July 1,

!l1983 of the purchase price provided in the Option, the Option is
specifically enforced and title to the Anderson Ranch situated in
Cache County, Utah and described as follows:
Parcel 1: The Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter;
the Sout h half of the Northeast quarter; the Southeast
quarter of the Northwest quarter; the East half of the
Southeas t quarter; the Northwest quarter of the Southwest
quarter .of Section 26; the North half of .the Northwest
quarter; the Southwest quarter of the Southeast quarter of
Section 25; the Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter;
the Nort heast quarter of the Southeast quarter; the Southwest
quarter of the Southeast quarter; the South half of the
Southwes t quarter of Section 24; the Southeast quarter of the
Southeas t quarter of Section 23; in Township 10 North, Range
3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; Lots 2, 3 and 4; the
Southeas t quarter of the Southwest quarter; the Southwest
quarter of the Southeast quarter; and the Northeast quarter
of the S outheast quarter of Section 19, Township 10 North,
Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
Parcel 2: The West half of the Southeast quarter and the
East half of the Southwest quarter of Section 26, Township 10
North, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
Parcel 3: The Northeast quarter; the Southeast quarter of
the Northwest quarter; the Northeast quarter of the Southwest
quarter; the Northwest quarter of the Southeast quarter of
j
Section 19, the East half of the Northeast quarter; and the j
North half of the Southeast quarter of Section 30, in
!
!
Township 10 North, Range 4 East of the Salt Lake Base and
Meridian. Also the Southwest quarter of Section 25, and the
Southwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of Section 26,
Township 10 North, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian.

N & HOGGAN
RNEYS A T LAW
tEST CENTER
} 'SOX 5 2 5

1) 752-1551

Parcel 4: The West half of the Northeast quarter; the
Northeast quarter of the Northwest quarter; and the Southeast

-4quarter of the Southwest quarter; of Section 30, Township 10
North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
Containing 1840.14 acres, more or less, subject to existing
rights of way.
Together with all water rights appurtenant to the abovedescribed property.
is hereby vested and quieted in Plaintiff free and clear of
all right and claim by Defendants, Royalty Investment Corporation
or Colman and any claiming by, under or through Defendants,
Royalty Investment Corporation or Colman.
4.

The $650,000.00 deposited by Plaintiff with the Clerk of

the Court is declared to be payment in full by Plaintiff to
Defendants for the Anderson Ranch.

The Clerk of the Court is

authorized and directed to deliver to Defendants on their request
the 5650,000.00 principal.
5.

All interest accrued on the $650,000.00 deposited by

Plaintiff with the Clerk of the Court is declared to be the
propertv of Plaintiff and the Clerk of the Court is authorized and
directed to deliver all such accrued interest to Plaintiff on his
reques t.
6.

The legal description in the Option (recorded in Book 310

at Page 144 of the records of the Cache County, Utah Recorder) in
the Real Estate Contract (recorded in Book 310 at Page 147 of the
records of the Cache County, Utah Recorder) in the Waiver and
Release (recorded in Book 315 and Page 658 of the records of the
Cache County, Utah Recorder), as well as in the Verified Complaint
filed by the Plaintiff herein, are each and all reformed to show
Parcel 3 situated in Township 10 North, rather than Township 10
South.
7.

That possession of the Anderson Ranch, described above,

is hereby delivered to Plaintiff free and clear of any claim,
S & HOGGAN
*N£YS AT LAW
'EST CENTER
3 =»OX 525
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-5possessory or otherwise, of Defendants, Third-Party Defendants
and Royalty Investment Corporation, or any claiming by, under or
through Defendants and/or Third-Party Defendants and/or Royalty
Investment Corporation.
8. The attempted exercise of the paragraph 4.b. option under
the Real Estate Contract by Colman (and Archer and Wolfe) on July
2, 1984 is declared by the Court to be an invalid exercise of that
option right. The agreement and any assignments or conveyances of
whatsoever nature between Colman and the Defendants related
thereto are hereby declared void and of no effect as to the
parties herein; and full, undivided title in fee simple to the
Anderson Ranch is hereby quieted in Plaintiff *a§ against any and
all claims or rights of Defendants, Third-Party Defendants and
Royalty Investment Corporation, or any claiming by, under or
through Defendants and/or Third-Party Defendants and/or Royalty
Investment Corporation.
9. The Plaintiff's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment and
Motion To Strike are rendered moot bv this Judgment and Decree,
which effectively grants the partial relief sought by those
motions but which is based on the entire trial record.
10. The Defendants1 Cross-Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment is denied. Defendantsf Counterclaim against the
Plaintiff and Defendants' Third-Party Complaint against Colman are
dismissed with prejudice.
11. That Exhibits 28, 54, 55 and 56 are admitted in / m, ~r ,;
evidenced A^/;<-^*^« c.i^i^^^A

L^rfLr ^<-^t ^

f

12.' The parties shall bear their own respective attorney's
fees, but Plaintiff is awarded his court costs incurred herein.
DATED this / - day of-<&%, 1986. -.
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-6MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing
Judgment and Decree to Defendants1 Attorney, E. Craig Smay, at 208
Kearns Building, 136 South Main, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101; and
to Third-Party Defendant, William J, Colman, at 1935 South Main,
Suite 301, Salt Lake City, Utah 84105, postage prepaid in Logan,
Utah, this tf*9- day of July, 1 986.

,iP^S^^c(
L. Brent Hoggan
WLF/28

-7MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a certified copy of the foregoing
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law and Judgment and Decree to
L. Brent Hoggan, Olson & Hoggan, Attorneys for Plaintiff, 56 West Center,
P. 0. Box 525, Logan, Utah 84321; E. Craig Smay at 208 Kearns Building,
136 South Main, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 and to Third-Party Defendant,
William J. Colman, at 1935 South Main, Suite 301, Salt Lake City, Utah
84105, postage prepaid in Brigham City, Utah, this 7th'day of August,
1986.
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L. Brent Hoggan
OLSON & HOGGAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
56 West Center
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone
752-1551

L 1936

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE
ERNEST J. MILLER,
Plaintiff
vs
JOHN D. ARCHER and ELIZABETH
B. ARCHER, both individually and
as Trustees for the Elizabeth
Daly Archer Trust, and HUBERT
WOLFE. JUDY W. WOLFE, and ELLIOTT
WOLFE, as Trustees for Elliott
Wolfe Trust No. 701,

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Defendants,

JOHN D. ARCHER and ELIZABETH
B. ARCHER, both individually and
as Trustees for the Elizabeth
Daly Archer Trust, and HUBERT
WOLFE, JUDY W. WOLFE, and ELLIOTT
WOLFE, as Trustees for Elliott
Wolfe Trust No. 701,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs .
WILLIAM J. COLMAN,
N & HOGGAN
RNEYS AT LAW
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Third-Party Defendant.

Civil No. 21692

-2THIS

LMATTER

having come on for trial before the above-

entitled Court, the Honorable Omer J. Call

District Judge,

presiding and sitting without a jury, on September 18. 19, 20

27.

October 3, November 14, and December 17, 1985* and Plaintiff
having been represented by its counsel of record, L. Brent Hoggan,
of Olson & Hoggan, and the Defendants having been represented by
their counsel of record, E. Craig Smay. and the Third-Party
Defendant, knowingly, voluntarily and after discussing the same
with the Court, having been represented by himself- and the Court
having heard testimony from witnesses for all the parties hereto
and having received and accepted certain exhibits offered by the
parties as evidence in the matter' and the Courts having received
trial briefs from counsel for both Plaintiff and the Defendants on
the primary issues before the Court- and the Court having made and
entered its written Memorandum Decision herein, and having
reviewed and considered Plaintiff's proposed Findings, Conclusions
and Judgment and Defendants1 Objections thereo

and being fully

advised in the premises, THE COURT DOES NOW MAKE AND ENTER THE
FOLLOWING FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The real property which is the subject of this action by

Plaintiff for specific performance of a purchase option relating
'to said property is a composite of several semi-contiguous parcels
of undeveloped land and appurtenant water rights located Southeast
of Paradise. Utah, comprising in the whole 1840.14 acres, more or
less, primarily used for cattle grazing and recreation, and
generally known and referred to hereinafter as the

tf

Anderson

51

Ranch , which property is located totally within the boundaries of
Cache County. Utah, and more particularly described as follows
Parcel 1: The Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarterthe South half of the Northeast quarter - the Southeast
quarter of the Northwest quarter- the East half of the
Southeast quarter- the Northwest quarter of the Southwest

-3quarter o f Section 26 < the North half of the
Northwest quarter • the Sout hwest quarter of the Southeast
quarter o f Section 25- the Northeast quarter of the
Northeast quarter :, the Nort heast quarter of the Southeast
quarter * the Sout hwest quar ter of the Southeast quarter: the
South hal f of the Southwest quarter of Section 24' the
Southeast quarter of the So utheast quarter of Section 23* in
Township 10 North , Range 3 East. Salt Lake Base and Meridian
Lots 2, 3 and 4 * the Southe ast quarter of the Southwest
quarter - the Sout hwest quar ter of the Southeast quarter - and
the North east qua rter of th e Southeast quarter of Section 19
Township 10 North . Range 4 East. Salt Lake Base and
Mer idian.
Parcel 2: The West half of the Southeast quarter and the
East half of the Southwest quarter of Section 26. Township 10
North. Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
Parcel 3
The Northeast quarter the Southeast quarter of
tFe"Northwest quarter; the Northeast quarter of the Southwest
quarter* the Northwest quarter of the Southeast quarter of
Section 19. the East half of the Northeast quarter; and the
North half of the Southeast quarter of Section 30, in
Township 10 North, Range 4 East of the Salt Lake Base and
Meridian. Also the Southwest quarter of Section 25, and the
Southwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of Seer ion 26,
Township 10 North. Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian.
Parcel 4: The West half of the Northeast quarter; the
Northeast quarter of the Northwest quarter- and the Southeast
quarter of the Southwest quarter; of Section 30, Township 10
North, Range 4 East, SaLt Lake Base and Meridian.
<5rfe/#' '<v*

Together with all water rights
described property.
2.

to the above-

The Plaintiff herein, Ernest Junior Miller (hereinafter

"MilLer"), is a resident of Cache County. Utah.

The Defendants

named herein, both as individuals and as trustees, John D. Archer
(hereinafter "Archer"), Elizabeth B. Archer, Elliott Wolfe
(hereinafter "Wolfe"), Hubert Wolfe and Judy W. Wolfe, are all
residents of Salt Lake County, Utah.
N a HOGGAN
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The Third-Party Defendant

herein, William J. Colman (hereinafter "Colman")-, is also a

-4
resident of Salt Lake County, Utah.

MilLer. Coiman, Archer

and Wolfe are men of considerable business experience and acumen,
particuarly in matters of cattle raising and beef fabrication
(Miller), mining, oil and gas (Coiman and Archer) and real estate
(Archer, Wolfe and Coiman). J\eehtrc—arnrt~"Wol fe aic mun of—eet«4nde^ab-le—f-wn^nr vM~-^su&&V3ttce
3.

Coiman is a shareholder and President of Royalty

Investment Corporation, also known as Royalty Investment Company
(hereinafter "Royalty"), a Utah corporation.

Most, if not all. of

the balancer-of JRoyalty's stock, is owned by Colman's relatives > and
the company is. within Coiman1s effective control.
the Anderson Ranch for Royalty

i

^

Coiman acquired^

r p i = : ^ by purchasing E. H. Cameron

and H. C. Anderson's rights (as Buyers) under a June 1961 Contract
of Sale with LaMar Anderson and Lucille Anderson (as Sellers).
4.

In the late Summer or early Fall of 1981, Coiman ap-

proached Defendant Archer for a loan of $750,000.00, money whicn
CoLman urgentLy needed to continue development of the Carson Sink
salt project (certain mineral rights and evaporation ponds used
for commercial salt production located in Nevada).

Said mineral

project was owned by Owanah Oil Corporation, of which Coiman was
President, and was in serious financial trouble due, at least in
part, to excessive precipitation in the past.
5.

Subsequently, Archer advised Coiman that Archer and

Wolfe, with whom Archer had discussed Colman's offer,

were not

interested in a simple Loan and were not interested in investing
^!T^rj^^ha?F==^©:@=^afeQ# in any event.

'ft

Coiman suggested that fr-he:

could be secured by the Anderson
Ranch (indicating that Coiman. at least, beLieved the ranch had
that much value).

The possibility of a limited partnership

interest in the Carson Sink salt project was also discussed.
N & HOGGAN
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6.

Based upon these preliminary discussions. Coiman had his

long-time attorney, Frank J. Allen, of Salt Lake City. Utah
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(hereinafter "Allen"), prepare a document (Exhibit 1) by which
Archer and Wolfe would invest $600,000.00 in a limited partnership
for the Carson Sink project, which investment Coiman would secure

!
c

;/

5with a Trust Deed on the Anderson Ranch.

Said document was

never executed.
7.

Subsequently

and after considering certain tax savings

possibilities with their accountants. Archer and WoLfe advised
CoLman that they were only interested in advancing Colman
$500,000.00 total for his salt project, and this on condition that
the $500,000.00 be structured to appear by record as an investment
of $250,000.00 in a Limited partnership on the salt project,
providing tax write-offs for research and development expenses,
and an interest in profits during the life of the partnership and
an overriding royaLty thereafter; and with the other $250,000.00
to be shown as the purchase price for the Anderson Ranch, coupled
with a one-year option in Colman to reacquire the Ranch for
$600,000.00, which would permit Defendants to treat the difference
as a capital gain.

Archer, Wolfe and Colman reached an agreement

in principle on this arrangement, and Defendants accepted Colman's
suggestion that Allen draw up the necessary papers to document the
deal.
8.

In October and/or November of 1981, Archer, Wolfe and

Colman met with Allen at the latterfs office on at least two
separate occasions, first to discuss their agreement and later to
execute the documents prepared by Mr. Allen pursuant to their
instructions.

AlLen was advised by Archer, Wolfe and Colman that.

although the primary purpose of the arrangement was to get
$500,000.00 to Colman for his salt project, they wanted the deal
structured such that it would appear as three separate
transactions (i.e., the limited partnership, the purchase of the

It
* *
I & HOGGAN
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ranch, and the option back on the ranch), $Q a&—&* 1P,WP PT—p^rpg^
rr2^^^ar^^fe=$K§: and secure Archer and Wolfe all the tax
advantages they were seeking.

The structure of the deal was not

so critical to Colman as securing the $500,000.00 from the
Defendants, as long as he had an opportunity to get the Anderson

EST CENTER
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Ranch back.

The different dates on the various documents were

'.j-*321
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largely irrelevant to him.

He was in great need of the money and

-6was willing to use the various resources within his control to
consummate a deal any way he could.
9.

Pursuant to the directions received from Archer, Wolfe

and 'Colman, Allen prepared the Certificate and Agreement of
Limited Partnership of Solar Chemical Company, for Archer and
Wolfe's $250,000.00 contribution to the salt project (Exhibit 3,
hereinafter the "Limited Partnership Agreement11) , the Contract for
Purchase of Real Property, for the purchase by Defendants of the
Anderson Ranch for $250,000.00 (Exhibit 4, hereinafter the
"Contract"), the Special Warranty Deed from Royalty to the
Defendants (Exhibit 5 ) , and an option from Defendants to Colman to
permit him to repurchase the Anderson Ranch for $600,000.00.
Subsequently, the parties agreed to give Colman an option on the
Anderson Ranch for 1-1/2 years for a purchase price of $650,000.00
(Exhibit 8, hereinafter the "Option").

The original one (l)-year

option for $600,000.00 was never executed by the parties.
10.

The Limited Partnership Agreement establishing Solar

Chemical Company was dated October 15, 1981, as was Archer's
initial check to Owanah Oil Corporation, the General Partner in
Solar Chemical Company, for $50,000.00 (Exhibit 23). Colman was a
shareholder and President of Owanah, which company apparently was
within his effective control.
11.

The Limited Partnership Agreement provided for periodic

contributions by the Limited Partners. Archer and Wolfe, totaLling
$250,000.00, and states that Archer and Wolfe were each to receive
a five percent (5%) share in Solar Chemical's net profits over
three (3) years and that each would receive a one-half of one
percent ( #&$57o) overriding royalty thereafter on all sodium salts
recovered from the project.
12.

The Contract between Royalty (signed by Colman, as

President), as Seller, and Archer, Archer's wife and Wolfe, as the
N & HOGGAN

RNEYSATLAW

s o l e named T r u s t e e of E l l i o t t

Wolfe T r u s t 701 ( h e r e i n a f t e r

the
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sale of the Anderson Ranch to the Defendants, specifying January
4, 1982 as the closing date.
as

Was W o l f e ' s

rhprV

It was dated November 9, 1981,

t~o P r w - » ! f - w
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-713. The Special Warranty Deed conveying the Anderson Ranch
from Royalty (again signed by CoLman, as President) to the
Defendants was dated January 4, 1982 (Exhibit 5 ) . Said Special
Warranty Deed, as well as the Contract and the Option, all contain
a scrivinorfs error in the legal description of the Anderson
Ranch, mistakenly and unintentionally referencing Township 10
South, instead of Township 10 North, in Parcel 3 thereof. No
evidence was received (or offered) suggesting that Colman acted
without authority in executing the Contract, the Special Warranty-^
&
Deed oi
>r subsequent deeds as President .of Royalty Investment
J
Corporation. The documents/}^vf-H^rrfcaate^valid;;op -•1ihrfTs=aTrrr-e-.
14. The Option from the Defendants to Colman was dated March
of 1982 (viz, "this
day of March, 1982"). The purpose of
said Option was to allow Colman the right to reacquire the Anderson Ranch on or before July 2, 1983 for $650,000.00. It was
executed by Archer, Mrs. Archer and Wolfe in their individual and
.-o
respective trustee capacities. T&e-iT—ex^^^^i^^—trf—Die OplTorF- gs'^'l*
cciiii^e^rpnTrds—-pireeibely with how they rook citrle to (The Anderson <y [ ^
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15. All of the aforereferenced documents. Exhibits 3, 4, 5
and 8, were prepared at or about the same time by Frank Allen,
pursuant to the instructions of the parties, as part of a unified,
integrated transaction. They were all executed by the parties on
the same date, most likely on or about November 9, 1981, as
indicated on the back of said check.
16. Although Colman was in debt and had an acute need for
funds to continue his salt project, Archers' check to Owanah Oil
in the amount of $50,000.00, dated October 15, 1981 (Exhibit 2 3 ) ,
was not cashed by Colman until on or about November 10, 1981, as
indicated on the back of said check.
;
(s
^
V\ 17. j Colman and his attorney, Allen, required a simultaneous
execution of the documents, particularly the Contract, the
original Special Warranty Deed and the Option, in order to assure
that Colman was protected as to his right to reacquire the
Anderson Ranch, even though the dates were spaced out for
Defendants1 tax purposes. The Court finds it probable that
Archer, likewise, was unwilling to part with his first check for
$50,000.00 prior to securing the Defendants' position with a

-8Limited Partnership Agreement, Contract and Option be executed
at the same time so that Colman would not be deeding away the
Anderson Ranch without a right to repurchase the same.

Such an

entitlement was always part of the parties1 agreement and
essential to Colman1s willingness to enter into the related
transactions.

Colman was promised that right to repurchase the

Ranch as part of the total deal and relied on that promise in
executing the deed conveying the Ranch to Defendants.
18.

Elliott Wolfe represented to Colman and Allen that he

had authority to sign any agreement for his trust and intended
that his signature bind the trust and that Colman and Allen rely
thereon-, and Colman and Allen did rely upon his representation and
signature.

Mrs*

Archer's signature was secured the same day that

the other parties signed the Option, or the very next day.

The

Option was then deLivered by Archer, either that same day or the
next day, to CoLman.
19.

AlLen never received a copy of the Wolfe Trust agreement

from Wolfe (nor was it produced at trial): nor did the other
ostensible trustees to the Wolfe Trust, Hubert Wolfe and Judy
Wolfe, ever notify Colman, Allen or Miller that they objected to
Wolfe's binding the Trust by his signature alone

nor did Wolfe

seriously claim that he lacked authority to bind the Wolfe Trust.
20.

The Option reads that it was given to Colman "in

consideration of the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) and
other good and valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged".

This recital of $5,000.00 and the "other good and

valuable consideration" came from Allen, who had also inserted the
same figure in the original, one-year, $600,000.00 option to
Colman. which was never executed.

The fictitious $5,000.00

consideration was carried over to the Option (Exhibit 8 ) , which
reflects the parties1 agreement to give Colman an option for 1-1/2
N & HOGGAN
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years

for an a d d i t i o n a l

$50,000.00

(total:

$650,000.00),

which
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Option was executed.
21. Said $5,000.00 was never intended by the parties to be
•

y

r

paid.
It was merely window-dressing which Allen p u l l e d out of t h e
a i r and i n s e r t e d to g i v e c r e d e n c e to the document as p a r t of the

-9Defendants acknowledged receipt of the-same, even though they
had not actually received $5,000.00, because they all knew it was
not to be paid. The real consideration for the Option consisted
of the ''other good and valuable consideration", which included the
conveyance of the Anderson Ranch by Special Warranty Deed from
Royalty to the Defendants, the $650,000.00 to be paid for the
Anderson Ranch upon exercise of the Option, the Limited
Partnership benefits as to profit sharing and the overriding
royalty, and the various tax benefits accruing to the Defendants
by structuring the total transaction their way. The Court finds
that it was never the intent of the parties at the time the Option
was granted that $5,000.00 was the consideration for the Option,
or that the $5,000.00 would, in fact, ever be paid.
22. The Court notes that the Option on its face and by its
terms gives the Defendants no right of revocation. There are no
restrictions on its face as to its assignability by Colman to
third parties, nor is there any language suggesting the Option was
strictly personal to Colman.
23. Within a week after November 15, 1981, the date of a
title commitment from Northern Title Company (Exhibit 64), said
report was mailed to Colman or Allen by said title company. This
title report, among other things, disclosed an error in the legal
description of the Anderson Ranch, as set forth in paragraph 13 of,
these Findings. Two Special Warranty Deeds (Exhibits 6 and 7)
were subsequently prepared for the purpose of conveying the
Anderson Ranch from Royalty to the Defendants with the necessary
correction to the legal description (i.e., changing "Township 10
South" to "Township 10 North" for Parcel 3). They were dated
January 4, 1982, and recorded by Allen on January 7, 1982. The
new Special Warranty Deed for the Wolfe interest (Exhibit 7) in
the Anderson Ranch was conveyed to "Elliott Wolfe, Trustee of the
Elliott Wolfe Trust No. 701", and so recorded, without any
A &HOGGAN
[NEYSATLAW

reference to co-trustees.
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24. On January 22, 1982, a Correction of Correction Deed
(Exhibit 45) was executed by Lucille Anderson to Royalty, and
thereafter recorded to correct the error contained in the

-10legal description of the 1980 deed from her and her husband to
Royalty for the Anderson Ranch.
25.
Option.

Colman never paid $5,000.00 to the Defendants for the
Neither Archer nor Wolfe ever made any written request to

Colman to pay the $5,000.00.

When Archer made his first verbal

inquiry regarding payment of the $5,000.00, which may have been
sometime in March, 1982, Colman told him that he did not believe
he had to pay the $5,000.00.

When Colman contacted Allen, Allen

reaffirmed for him that the $5,000.00 was never intended to be
paid and advised Colman against paying it, inasmuch as the
consideration supporting the total deal was comprised of those
considerations set forth hereinabove at Finding'22.

Allen

consistently advised Colman, Archer, Wolfe and Plaintiff that the
parties to the Option never intended for Colman to pay the
$5,000.00.
26.

Colman never conceded that he owed the $5,000.00.
The Defendants' Later assertions that Colman's

non-payment of the $5,000.00 rendered the Option invalid and
unenforceabLe lacks credibility

, This Court finds that

Defendants ' argument is Xme^r^e-by—^^
ttey—gjj-ed-^ n an a£-teafrpt.. -te==txi.yui-Lidate—t+re^QptTTOri.

It was never

agreed or intended that Colman was to pay $5,000.00 to the
Defendants.

The number recited was fictitious, which is why the

Defendants signed the Option acknowledging their receipt of that
sum, as well as their receipt of the "other good and valuable
consideration", which phrase circumscribed the true consideration
for the Option,

The Defendants' testimony as to their purported

negotiations, renegotiations and the calculations which they
allege resulted in the $5,000.00 consideration for the Option is
contradicted not only by Allen's testimony and Colman's Affidavit,
but by Defendant's own pleadings (viz., paragraph 4 of their
Third-Party Complaint).
N & HOGGAN
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The Defendants represented to Colman and his attorney

that CoLman would have a right to reacquire the Anderson Ranch.
Defendants intended that Colman and his attorney should rely on
those representations and upon the sufficiency of the Option, as
executed.

Colman and his attorney did rely on those

representations and on the Option as executed.
Defendants

1

In light of

subsequent repudiation of the Option, that reliance

was to Colman's detriment.
28.

Archer and Wolfe never visited the Anderson Ranch or the

Carson Sink salt project until the Spring of 1982.

They never

checked the title to the Carson Sink properties, nor did they ever
verify the water rights appurtenant to the And ej: son Ranch, until
the Spring of 1982.

The Defendants never secured title insurance

on the Anderson Ranch.
29.

The overriding royalty rights in the Carson Sink which

the Limited Partnership Agreement states wiLl be assigned to
Archer and Wolfe had not been assigned to them or recorded by them
at the time of trial, four (4) years after trie Limited Partnership
Agreement was executed.

No profits have ever been paid out by

SoLar Chemical to Archer or Wolfe.
30.

The price purportedly paid for the Anderson Rancn by

Defendants to Royalty ($250,000.00), and the price which Colman
was to pay Defendants to reacquire the Anderson Ranch under the
Option only eighteen (18) months later ($650,000.00), cannot, as a
matter of reason, stand alone.

The property was professionally

appraised (See Exhibit 59) for $427,240.00 ten (10) years prior to
the sale by Colman to the Defendants.

Moreover, even if the

Anderson Ranch was worth only $250,000.00 on January 4, 1982, the
Court cannot believe that Colman had a reasonable expectation that
the market value of the Anderson Ranch would be 2607o of its prior
sales value only 1-1/2 years later (or at any time in between).
4 & HOGGAN
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was a totally separate transaction and that Colman got the best

12price he could for the ranch at the time, it was admitted that
Colman, who had known for several years that Miller was interested
in acquiring the Anderson Ranch or an interest therein, never
contacted Miller to see if he would be interested in bidding more
than 3250,000.00 for it.

These prices make sense only when viewed

in the context of the layer, unified transaction.
31.

Although it is not strictLy necessary to its decision,

the Court finds that the $650,000.00 purchase price for Colman1s
exercise of the Option more truly corresponds to a twenty percent
(207o) return on a composite $500,000.00 secured investment by
Defendants in Colman1s salt project for one and one-half (1-1/2)
years.

The total transaction was the functional equivalent of a

secured loan ($500,000.00 loaned by Defendants to Colman for 1-1/2
years at 207o interest, secured by the Anderson Ranch in case he
failed to repay them), dressed up so as to give Archer and Wolfe
certain additional incentives and to secure the Defendants various
tax advantages (e.g., the tax write-off for their investment in
Solar Chemical was worth a minimum to Archer and Wolfe of
$60,000.00 -- See Exnibit li).
32.
Allen.

The Court finds much credibility m

the testimony of

His recollections under oath are entitled to great weight.

He was the only witness to the original negotiations and the
preparation and execution of the central documents who was not a
party to the same.

He has no interest in the Anderson Ranch or

the outcome of this litigation.

Judging by his own testimony, and

that of the Plaintiff, John Clay and John Miller, and Allen's own
April 29, 1983 Affidavit (Exhibit 27), his statements have been
consistent from the beginning with respect to the true nature of
the parties' integrated transaction and the Option, in particular.
If Allen's testimony were to be biased, one would reasonably
^ & HOGGAN
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expect that bias to favor his client

contradicted Colman's recollections at trial on several critical

EST CENTER
) BOX 5 2 5
^TA* 8 4 3 2 1
I) 7 5 2

J551

but instead, Allen

facts.

-13-

33-

By contrast, the testimony of Bill Colman at trial, when

measured against his admissions on cross-examination, and the
contradictions contained in his prior deposition, his Affidavit of
May 2, 1983 (Exhibit 28), and his handwritten notes (Exhibits 54,
55 and 56), convince the Court that his testimony at trial is
entitled to very little weight or credibility.

Although Colmanfs

Affidavit and handwritten notes are not strictly necessary to the
Court's decision herein, they represent a more reliable index of
the true history and intention of the parties than his trial
testimony several years later and also serve to seriously impeach
his trial testimony.

His affidavit was signed under oath at a

time when the relevant facts were much fresher in his memory than
at trial, when his recollection of several matters was
insufficient or non-existent.

When Plaintiff's counsel presented

him with Exhibits 54, 55 and 56, Colman expressed considerable
surprise, alarm and anger, but admitted subsequently that they
were copies of his own handwritten notes which he then read for
the Court.

Although tne notes are not totally legible, are

partially cut off by the copier (particularly Exhibit 5 4 ) , and
were stapled together by Plaintiff's attorneys, they are for the
most part dated, reference Defendants Archer and Wolfe and have a
certain narrative flow and consistency that gives them substantial
credibility.

Any undue surprise to Defendants was overcome by the

several days interval they had to inspect the Exhibits after their
introduction and before Colman's testimony on the same.

The

demeanor of all the witnesses was significant to the Court during
this trial.

-14-

34.

In the late Spring or early Summer of 1982. Miller

learned from Archer and Wolfe that they had obtained an interest
in the Anderson Ranch.

Subsequently, either in August or

September of 1982, Miller discussed the status of the Anderson
Ranch with Colman, who represented to Miller that Archer and
Wolfe's interest in the Anderson Ranch was in the nature of a
security interest.

At the same time, Colman indicated a desire to

sell his rights in the Anderson Ranch to Miller.
35.

Plaintiff's attorney, William L. Fillmore, of Logan,

Utah, (hereinafter

ff

Fi llmore1') , thereafter communicated with both

Colman and Allen and received from them copies of the documents
covering the prior integrated transaction between Colman and the
Defendants, including receipt from Colman of the Option with
original signatures of John Archer, Elizabeth Archer and Elliott
Wolfe, and an original notarization by Carole Lake.

The

correspondence between Fillmore, Allen and Colman (Exhibits 68,
69, 70 and 71) and testimony at trial indicate the preparation of
a draft Real Estate Contract by Fillmore, Allen and Colman1s
review of the same, negotiations (including one meeting at the
Salt Lake Airport between Colman, Miller, Fillmore and John
Miller, the Plaintiff's nephew), and the modification of the
original draft.
36.

On November 2, 1982, Colman and Allen met Plaintiff,

Fillmore and John Miller at the Salt Lake Airport to review and
execute the revised Real Estate Contract (Exhibit 9, hereinafter
the "Real Estate Contract") between Colman and Miller.

After

Colman and Allen reviewed the same, Colman and Miller then

-15executed the Real Estate Contract, dating the same November 2,
1982.

Pursuant to the contractual obligation contained therein

Miller paid the $1,000.00 consideration to Colman in December,
1982.
37.

The Real Estate Contract assigned all of Colman's rights

under the Option to Miller, granting Miller an independent right
to exercise the Option and acquire 1007o of the Anderson Ranch on
or before June 18, 1982.
38.

Colman knowingly, voluntarily and with advice of counsel

warranted in the Real Estate Contract to Miller that "the Option
is valid and enforcable and, further, that it is freely assignable
in its entirety without the consent or approval of any third
party.11
39.

As part of the Real Estate Contract, Miller gave Colman

a new and independent option to reacquire from Miller (if Miller
exercised the Option), on or before July 2, 1983, all of trie
Anderson Ranch by paying Plaintiff $650,000.00 on or before that
date (See Exhibit 9, para. 4.a.), and a second option to
reacquire, after July 2, 1983 and on or before July 2, 1984, up to
a 507o interest in the Anderson Ranch by paying his prorated share
of the purchase price, plus interest, taxes and improvements (See
para. 4.b.).

Plaintiff and Colman agreed that the Real Estate

Contract was not assignable by either party without the other
party's prior written consent (See paras. 4.e. and f.).
40.

Also as part of the Real Estate Contract, the parties

granted each other a mutual and reciprocal right of first refusal
with respect to either party's subsequent proposed sale of any of
their rights or interests in the Anderson Ranch, and specified a
thirty (30) day period in which to exercise the same after receipt
of written notice from the selling party, accompanied by a copy of
the duly executed contract of sale (See para. 5 ) .
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-1641. At the November 2, 1982 meeting in Salt Lake City, Utah,
whereat the Real Estate Contract was executed, it was observed
that Carole Lake, who had notarized the Option, had failed to fill
in the blank ("March
, 1982") in the notary's paragraph of the
original Option. Colman volunteered to have her correct this and
referred to the omission as a simple oversight. Subsequently, Ms.
Latce did fill in the blank with the number "1" and the Option was
returned to Fillmore by Colman for recording with the Real Estate
Contract, which recordings were effected in Cache County on
December 20, 1982.
42. After Archer and Wolfe received written notice from
Miller's attorney, Fillmore, of Colman1s assignment of his Option
rights to Plaintiff, Archer called Fillmore pn or about January 4,
1983 and told Fillmore, among other things, that the $5,000.00 for
the Option had never been paid by Colman. Nonetheless, Archer
indicated that Defendants were still willing to sell the Anderson
Ranch to Plaintiff if he would pay $655,000.00.
43. During January and February of 1983, Archer, Wolfe and
Fillmore engaged in negotiations for MilLer's purchase of the
Anderson Ranch', but the sale was never consummated because the
parties could not agree upon terms, and because Miller was seeking
a guaranty from Colman that he would not exercise his rights
under paragraph 4.a. in order to ensure that Miller would not
incur substantial financing costs in vain.
44. On April 8, 1983, the Defendants attempted to revoke the
Option by a letter to Colman from the Defendants' prior attorney,
Gregory P. Williams (Exhibit 15), wherein said attorney advised,
based upon his clients' position that "no consideration was given
for the Option", that "the offer has been withdrawn".
45. On April 15, 1983, Colman, Allen, Plaintiff, Fillmore,
John Miller and John Clay (an employee and financial adviser of
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Plaintiff)

met

at

Allen's

office

to confirm

what

Allen

and

Colman

-17had represented previously as to the history and intent behind the
Option given Colman by the Defendants, in light of Archer and
Wolfe's position on the $5,000.00 and what appeared to be a
probability of litigation over the same.

Colman and Allen

reaffirmed at that meeting to Plaintiff and his attorney and
employees that the $5,000.00 was never intended to be paid, but
was a number pulled out of the air by Allen as he prepared the
documents; that Wolfe represented that he had full authority to
sign the Option for his trust* and that the series of documented
transactions (the Limited Partnership, the Contract, the Special
Warranty Deed(s) and the Option), were all part of one, unified,
integrated scheme which was basically intended to get $500,000.00
to Colman for his salt project, secure the repayment of the same
with the Anderson Ranch and guaranty Colman the right to reacquire
the ranch upon his payback of the $500,000.00 plus a $150,000.00
premium on the same, structured in a way to give Defendants
additional incentives and secure certain tax benefits important to
them -- all of which comprised the true consideration for the
deal.

Allen and Colman agreed to give Plaintiff their Affidavits

to this effect.
46.

At the April 15, 1983 meeting in Salt Lake City, Colman

also indicated his willingness, after consulting further with
Allen, to sign a Waiver and Release similar to the one previously
requested by Plaintiff in February, 1983 (See Exhibit 34), because
Colman was m no position to purchase the Anderson Ranch before
July 2, 1983 and wanted Miller to buy it so that he (Colman) could
at least have a shot at acquiring a partial interest on or before
July 2, 1984.
47.

On April 19, 1983, Colman signed a Waiver and Release

for Miller's benefit, which Waiver and Release was subsequently
recorded in Cache County on April 20, 1983 (Exhibit 10,
si & HOGGAN
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Miller with the Waiver and Release was to give Miller

'^"t^ 2 '

unqualified

right,

The intent of Colman and
the

without any fear that Colman would attempt

to
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reacquire 100% of the Ranch, to exercise the Option and
acquire the Anderson Ranch on or before July 2, 1983, thereby (a)
guarantying Plaintiff, by Colman1s waiver of his paragraph 4.a.
option rights, that Plaintiff, at the very least, would be the
owner of 50% of the Anderson Ranch (even if Colman were to
exercise his option under paragraph 4.b. subsequently), (b)
eliminating the June 18, 1983 deadline for Miller's exercise of
the Option, because Colman was not in a position to exercise his
rights under the Option or the Real Estate Contract by July 2,
1983., and he wanted Miller to do so, and (c) assuring Colman that
he would later be able to exercise his 507o option reserved under
paragraph 4.b. if he could come up with the money on or before
July 2, 1984, because Miller's ownership of the ranch would then
make the paragraph 4.b. option possible. This mutual intent is
clearly refLected by the language contained in the Waiver and
Release: (viz., "...which Waiver and Release is executed by the
undersigned in order to induce said Ernest Junior Miller to
exercise his rights under the aforesaid Real Estate Contract and
purchase the subject property on or before July 2, 1983, without
fear of any claim of right by William J. Colman to repurchase the
same from Ernest J. Miller, except as to William J. Colman's
reserved right to purchase up to a 50% interest in the subject
property after July 2, 1983 and before July 2, 1984."). (Emphasis
added.)
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48. Colman induced Miller to exercise the Option, making it
clear that he had until July 2, 1983 to do so, for Colmanfs
benefit as well as Miller's. Because Colman, at that point, had
to rely on Miller's ability to purchase the ranch, he extended
Miller's time to exercise the Option until July 2, 1983, and
reserved only his right to reacquire up to 50% the next year. It
would have been irrational, given his financial circumstances and
his dependence on Miller's exercise, for Colman to arbitrarily
(and against his own best interests) limit the time for Miller to
exercise the Option. The purpose of the Waiver and Release was
further corroborated by Colman1s subsequent conduct after its

-19execution (i.e., no objection) and by Miller's conduct in
reliance thereon (i.e., its execution on July 1). The Court also
notes that the Defendants were not parties to the Waiver and
Release, nor were they privy to Coiman and Miller's intent
regarding the same.
49.

No consideration is stated on the face of the Waiver an

Release, but the Court finds from the testimony at trial that it
was given by Coiman in exchange for Miller's assurance that he
would exercise the Option, guarantying Coiman another year to
acquire a partial interest in the ranch, and as additional
consideration, for Miller's promise to Coiman that he would not
have to pay interest on any exercise of his paragraph 4.b. option
and that, in any event, Coiman would be entitled to use the
property for recreational purposes for the r'est of his life.
50.

Following a review of two draft affidavits prepared by

Fillmore, Allen prepared his own Affidavit (Exhibit 27), signed
and had it notarized on April 29, 1983.

Allen spent the better

part of the morning on May 2, 1983 with Coiman, preparing and
modifying his draft of Colman's Affidavit (Exhibit 28), which was
reviewed and discussed by them paragraph-by-paragraph, amended by
them, and then executed by Coiman and notarized by Allen's
secretary, all on the same day.
51.

On April 18, 1983, Plaintiff called Archer and offered

to pay $650,000.00 to the Defendants for the Anderson Ranch under
the Option.

Archer indicated that he would have to visit with

Wolfe before responding.

On April 20, 1983, Archer called Miller

back and informed him of the Defendants' rejection of Miller's
offer of $650,000.00 for the Anderson Ranch, indicating that
Defendants did not want to sell the property.
52.

In April of 1983, Archer and Wolfe attempted to persuad

Coiman to exercise his option rights under paragraph 4.a. of the
^ & HOGGAN
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-20however

that the Waiver and Release which Colman had signed

for Miller's benefit made such an attempt to prevent Miller

from

acquiring the ranch illegal.
53.

On May 16, 1983. Plaintiff filed this action against the

Defendants and a Lis Pendens against the Anderson Ranch.
24. 1983, the Defendants filed their Answer.

On June

Defendants filed

their Third-Party Complaint against Colman on June 30. 1983. and
then filed their Amended Answer and Counterclaim against Plaintiff
on July 1, 1983.
54.

On or about June 27 or 28, 1983, Fillmore called E.

Craig Smay, of Salt Lake City, Utah, the Defendants1 attorney
(hereinafter "Smay 11 ), to determine the best way to make the formal
tender of the $650,000.00 to the Defendants under the Option in
the context of this pending litigation concerning the same
property, the Option and the same parties.

Inasmuch as Archer and

Wolfe had rejected Miller's prior offer, and had expressly
repudiated the Option in their Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint,
all parties and their attorneys understood that Miller's tender of
a casnier's check would not be accepted by the Defendants.
Moreover, neither Archer nor Wolfe were in the State at the time.
Archer admitted on the stand that he would not have accepted
Plaintiff's tender of $650,000.00 on July 1, 1983 in any event.
Fillmore and Smay determined that the best way to handle the
matter would be to tender the $650,000.00 to the Defendants via
the Court and then deposit the same upon endorsement in a
Court-supervised, interest-bearing account.
55.

On July 1. 1983, Fillmore met with Smay at the latterfs

office in Salt Lake City and tendered to Smay, as Defendants1
attorney. Plaintiff's cashier's check to the Defendants for
$650,000.00 (Exhibit 13), which money had been borrowed by
Plaintiff, subject to interest charges.
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stipulated Order (Exhibit 14) , with the express understanding that
the check would be deposited in a Court-super /ised, interestbearing account and that "entitlement to accrued interest shall be
determined by the Court'1.

Pursuant thereto, Fillmore later

•21

that same day filed said Delivery of Check and Motion and the
Order with this Court and deposited the check with the Clerk of
the Court.
56.

The language contained in Plaintiff1s Complaint, and in

the Delivery of Check and Motion and the stipulated Order, and the
verbal expressions of Fillmore to Smay on July 1, 1983, substantially conformed with the tender language requirements of
paragraph 3 of the Option.
57.

The Option was exercised on JuLy 1, 1983 by Plaintiff,

without any- objection or protest being made by Colman to Plaintiff
either before or since.
58.

The Option was exercised by Plaintiff according to its

terms - i.e., the Option called for a tender of $650,000.00 on or
before July 2, 1983, which requirements Plaintiff met precisely.
The Defendants were in no way prejudiced by the date of
Plaintiff's execise of the Option, inasmuch as they had already
granted that much time to the original optionee.

Moreover, the

Defendants had already made it abundantly clear to Plaintiff, by
virtue of their prior rejections, that they did not intend to
accept any tender by Plaintiff regardless of when it might be
made.
59.

Shortly thereafter, at Smay's suggestion, the parties

through their attorneys entered into a Stipulation to replace the
original check (Exhibit 13) with a new check (Exhibit 16) , so as
to permit the deposit of the tendered funds, in the absence of the
Defendants from the State, into an interest-bearing account.
Pursuant to that Stipulation, $650,000.00 was subsequently
deposited at First Interstate Bank, Logan Branch.

In the Fall of

1983, the deposited funds were invested in revolving monthly
Certificates of Deposit at said bank, which arrangement continued
until the time of trial.
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60.

On July 2, 1984 Colman, Archer and Wolfe entered into a

certain Agreement (Exhibit 33), whereby Colman, for $5,000.00, M as
further consideration for this agreement," agreed to convey to
Archer and Wolfe a fifty percent (50%) .interest in Che Anderson

•22-
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Ranch which he hoped to procure through an attempted exercise
of his paragraph 4.b. option under the Real Estate Contract and
whereby Archer and Wolfe agreed to permit Plaintiff to withdraw
$364,000.00 from the Court-supervised savings account, as and for
Colman's tender of that sum, to make possibLe Coimanfs exercise of
the 4.b. option, with the express understanding that Coiman would
deed said interest over to Archer and Wolfe upon his receipt of a
deed from Miller. The Defendants and their attorney had
previously received copies of the Real Estate Contract by way of
Plaintiff's prior pleadings and the discovery herein.
61. On July 2, 1984, a Notice from Coiman (Exhibit 31) and a
Stipulation from the Defendants (Exhibit 32) was sejp/ed on John
Clay, an officer of E. A. Miller & Sons Packing Co., <sr compan^^c^
effectively controlled by Plaintiff, advising Plaintiff that
"^/
Defendants were willing to allow him to withdraw $364,000.00 from
the Court-supervised account for purposes of Colman's exercise of
the 4.b. option, which attempted exercise of the 4.b. option by
Coiman (and Archer and Wolfe) was never accepted by Miller.
62. Nonetheless, the funds in the Court-supervised account
were not Colman's funds, nor were they the Defendants' funds absent their delivery of a deed to Plaintiff (See the terms of Exhibit 14, paragraph 4), which they had not done. Moreover, if Miller had accepted such a tender on July 2, and withdrawn the funds,
the withdrawal would have been subject to an early withdrawal
penalty under the certificate of deposit (See Exhibit 60).
63. Prior to Colman's (and the Defendants') attempted exercise of the 4.b. option, neither Coiman nor Defendants had secured
Plaintiff's prior written approval of any assignment of Colman's
rights, as required by paragraph 4.f. of the Real Estate Contract,
nor was there any prior verbal notice to or approval by Plaintiff.
In fact, it appears that Defendants structured their deal in a
deliberate manner to avoid the non-assignability clause.
64. In connection with Colman's (and the Defendants1)
attempted exercise of the 4.b. option, no recognition was ever
given to Miller's first right of refusal. The Plaintiff was never

-23given written (or verbal) notice of the Agreement between
Defendants and Colman, nor the sale terms thereof which he would
have to meet, nor was he ever allowed to exercise his first right
of refusal within thirty (30) days after receiving a copy of what
should have been a conditional agreement between Colman and the
Defendants, pursuant to paragraph 5 of the Real Estate Contract•
Plaintiff did not learn of, or receive a copy of, the Agreement
between the Defendants and Colman until the discovery of the same
was compelled at Defendants' second depositions on September 27,
1984.

The Agreement between Colman and the Defendants

unconditionally required Colman to convey to Defendants all his
rights in the Anderson Ranch which he was to acquire pursuant to
paragraph 4.b.
65.

of the Real Estate Contract.

The Court finds no persuasive evidence of any kind

suggesting collusion or conspiracy between Colman and Plaintiff to
defraud Defendants of their interests in the Anderson Ranch or
regarding any damages suffered by Defendants related thereto, as
alleged in their Amended Answer and Counterclaim.

Indeed,

Defendants introduced little, if any, evidence concerning these
allegations.
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66.

The legal description of the Anderson Ranch contained in

the Contract, the Option, the Real Estate Contract, the Waiver and
Release and Plaintiff1s Complaint all contain an obvious
scrivenor's error, referencing "Township 10 South'1, instead of the
correct description, "Township 10 North", under Parcel 3.

None of

the parties herein are under any misconception as to which
l&HOGGAN
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claimed any prejudice if the Court reforms the same.

-2467.

The Defendants have enjoyed possession and all rights of

ownership of the Anderson Ranch since Plaintiff!s July 1, 1983
tender of the $650,000.00.

The Defendants have executed leases

with third parties for the use of the Anderson Ranch, most recently with Boyd Munns, to run cattle on the ranch property.

All

rents paid under such leases have been received by the Defendants.
68.

In contrast to the Defendants, the Plaintiff has

received no rents or income, nor has he had any other commercial
benefit, from the Anderson Ranch since his tender of $650,000.00
on July 1, 1983; nor has he had the use of his money since then.
What limited and sporadic recreational use Plaintiff has had of
the ranch has been without objection by the owners and similar to
that enjoyed historically by many others in fthe area.
69.

The Defendants could have received the $650,000.00

lodged in the Court-supervised savings account at any time after
July 1, 1983 if they would have provided Plaintiff with a proper
deed, but they have never delivered a deed to Plaintiff entitling
them to said tender money.
70.

The Court finds no persuasive evidence of any collusion

or conspiracy between Colman and Miller to defraud the Defendants
out of their interests in the Anderson Ranch, as alleged by
Defendants* in their Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint.
71.

Exhibits 54,55 and 56 are notes made by Colman at or

about the time of various conversations between Colman, Archer and
Wolfe and should be admitted as evidence.

Exhibit 28 is Colman1s

Affidavit made prior to this litigation and is corroborative of
the Court1s findings on various issues and should be admitted in
evidence for all purposes.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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1.

This Court has in rem jurisdiction over the Anderson

Ranch; personal jurisdiction over the Plaintiff, all the
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Defendants and the Third-Party Defendant; and subject matter
jurisdiction over those matters which have been brought before the
Court by way of the parties' pleadings, including without
limitation all matters affecting title to the Anderson Ranch as
between the parties named herein.
2. That the Real Estate Contract is valid and enforceable in
all respects and that the Option granted by Archer and Wolfe to
Colman is irrevocable, valid in all respects and is supported by a
sufficient consideration.
3. That the Option was fully assignable by Colman, was
assigned to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff is the owner and holder of
the Option. The Waiver and Release is a valid and enforceable
agreement in all respects and extended to July 2, 1983 the time
within which Miller should exercise the Optibn.
4. That Plaintiff made a valid exercise of the Option under
the circumstances and is entitled to a decree specifically
enforcing the Option.
5. Given the uniqueness of the Anderson Ranch property,
money damages would be inadequate compensation to the Plaintiff
for Defendants' repudiation of the Option.
6. That Plaintiff has paid the purchase price provided in
the Option by depositing the same with the Clerk of the Court and
a decree should enter awarding the $650,000.00 so paid by
Plaintiff to Defendants.
7. That interest accrued on the $650,000.00 purchase price
deposited with the Court is the property of Plaintiff and a decree
should enter awarding Plaintiff all interest accrued on said
$650,000.00 while in the custody of the Clerk of the Court.
8. That a decree should enter correcting the scrivenors
error describing Parcel 3 of the legal description in the Option,
Real Estate Contract, the Waiver and Release, and Plaintiff's

•26Verified Complaint, to Township 10 North rather than Township
10 South.
9. Neither the Real Estate Contract or the rights and
entitlements of Colman thereunder were assignable by Colman to any
third party without Plaintiff's prior written consent, which
consent was never sought nor given by Plaintiff.
10. The first right of refusal granted to Miller by Colman
under paragraph 5 of the Real Estate Contract was a valid, legal
right vested in Miller and enforceable by him against Colman and
any third party.
11. The Waiver and Release was a valid and enforceable
agreement between Colman and Plaintiff, was supported by adequate
consideration and was intended to and did enable Plaintiff to
it
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lawfully exercise the Option to purchase the Anderson Ranch on or
before July 2, 1983.
12. The attempted exercise of the paragraph 4.b. option
under the Real Estate Contract by Colman (and Defendants) on Julv
2, 1984 was an invalid exercise of that option right and is,
therefore, void and of no effect.
13. The said Warranty Deeds from Royalty Investment
Corporation to Defendants on the Anderson Ranch effected a valid
conveyance of the Anderson Ranch by Royalty Investment Corporation
to Defendants.
hxhibit$~Zs,
4 , DD
14. An order should enter admitting Exhibits28, D
54,
55 and
56 in ev
Possession of the Anderson Ranch should bs^delivered to -f\
15
Plaintiff.
16. Though the Court finds that the applicable burden of
proof upon Plaintiff is a preponderance of the evidence, the Court
concludes that Plaintiff has sustained his burden of proving his
claims against Defendants and Third-Party Defendants in this case
by clear and convincing evidence.

-2717. Plaintiff's pleadings should be amended to conform in
all respects to Plaintiff's theories, arguments and evidence
presented at trial.
LET JUDGMENT E^TER ACCORDINGLY#"
DATED this ^] -^ day of.-i^^'"~1986. . —
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Omer J. Call
District Judge
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to Defendants1 Attorney,
E. Craig Smay, at 208 Kearns Building, 136 South Main, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84101; and to Third-Party Defendant, William J. Colman,
at 1935 South Main, Suite 301, Salt Lake City, Utah 84105, postage
prepaid in Logan, Utah, this
day of July, 1986.
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